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1. Introduction
1.1. Peter of Mantua's treatise
Probably between 1384 and 1392 the Italian philosopher Petrus
Mantuanus (Peter of Mantua) composed a large work called Logica (1Lo-
gic1). One of the treatises of this work is called in the explicit of
the 1477 edition : Tractatus de veritate et falsitate, sive de taliter
et qualiter ('Treatise on the truth and falsity of a proposition , or
on things being in this way, or being in some way or other')
1.2. Aim of this paper
In this paper I intend to show that Peter of Mantua distinguishes
between two ways in which the human mind can think, speak or write
about things outside itself:
a. Things can be conceived, on the one hand, under a specific
concept or according to a specific way of being: It is precisely under
this concept or according^ to a specific way of being that things are
presented to the human mind and on no account can this concept be
exchanged for another. According to this way of conceiving things, the
human mind (ratio) plays a decisive role in the identification of
things known.
b. On the other hand, things can be conceived without a specific
concept or without a specific way of existence^ jjeing relevant.
According to this way of conceiving things, things are known as things
(res) which can be considered by someone under a specific concept, but
this may also occur under another concept (by which, e.g., someone else
considers it).
I shall illustrate this distinction by two examples:
1. Things can be considered either according to a specific way of
being, or as things:
4)
To use Peter's examples: God can be considered, on the one hand,
according to a specific way (modus) of His being. In this way,
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God can be described, e.g., in as far as He produces something outside
Himself, or in as far as He is a finite being that moves quickly, or
in as far as He is contingent in a certain moment of time. Considered
in this way, Peter says, God's being and properties are comparable
with the being and properties of the things that are created by Him.
On the other hand, God can be considered as far as He is a thing
(res) in reality outside the human mind. According to that way of
consideration, such concepts as 'producing something outside Himself'
etc. cannot be applied to Him as exclusively naming God as thing, that
is: God's Essence. If this were so, the concepts 'producing something
outside Himself' etc. would refer to the very thing which is God: in
other words : to His Essence, and this is certainly not the case. I f
one wishes to name God1s Essence, something like 'Necessary Being'
should be applied first. According to this latter way of considera-
tion, God Himself is signified as something not to be compared with
other things.
2. My second example is intended to illustrate the distinction
between the different ways in which the human mind can conceive
things, according to such properties as money, or white etc. Such a
property is not a specific mode of being like contingent, as
illustrated above, but refers to the substance or accidents of a
thing.
Take the example of money. Given a certain number of small pieces
of metal ; these can be called money. Now, it is possible for me to
conceive them precisely under the concept of money and to love these
small pieces of metal just for their being money.
This way of considering things under a specific concept is
discussed by e.g. Marsilius of Inghen (c. 1340-1396). In his treatise
Appellationes, he illustrates this kind of conception of things by way
of the example diligo ^ aecuniam ( 'I love money' ) (see Marsilius of
Inghen, ed. 1983: 154). Construed in this way the proposition
signifies that I love money precisely in as far as it is money. Here,
pecuniam is said by Marsilius to have appellatio rationis, that is: by
the fact that the term (viz. pecuniam) has this content things are
referred to under this specific concept. The term money brings to my
mind the property of being-money of a certain number of small pieces
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of metal. In the way of being money, and for nothing else, the metal
things are presented to me. One is reminded of Frege ' s 'Art des
Gegebenseins'. The thing itself is not signified, but the thing
under a specific aspect, in which it possibly communicates with other
things, e.g. paper money.
The human mind can also consider things without a specific
concept being relevant. Things as such (like res) are at the centre of
his interest. These things can be named under different concepts: a
specific concept is not relevant, however.
In the case posited above, this kind of consideration is
illustrated by pecuniam diligo. This should be interpreted as: there
is something, or: there are some things, which can be called money;
this thing, or these things, I love. I do not necessarily love the
small pieces of metal under the aspect money. Within this context I
could very well have named them: 'beautiful silver coins' or something
like that. Marsilius of Inghen says that pecuniam has suppositio
determinata, that is : there is reference to things (res) without any
specific concepts being relevant.
In a recent paper (to which I am much indebted for this
contribution) Nuchelmans (1983) has lucidly discussed the two kinds of
consideration of things in respect of a part of Paul of Venice's
Logica Magna. Following Nuchelmans I call the kind of consideration of
things according to specific concepts (the level of ratio): intensio-
nal. This way of conceiving things notably occurs in propositions with
verbs that denote prepositional attitudes, that is: with verbs like to
believe, to know, to be uncertain, or with verbs that denote
modalities, like to be possible.
The other kind of consideration of things in which a specific
concepts is not relevant, I call, with Nuchelmans: extensional.
2. Three notes
Before verifying the proposed distinction of Peter of Mantua's
text, three things should be noted.
1. The distinction in the consideration of things applies equally
to ontological characteristics of things like contingent and to
categorical qualifications and properties, like money or white, which
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belong to contingent things.
2. The different ways in which things can be considered is not
primarily by way of propositions. Primarily, a knowing subject knows,
or names ( in writing and speech) , things known. Often» but not
primarily, our conception of things is communicated by way of
propositions .
This is evident from Peter's texts: he speaks of the aliqualiter
esse { 'being some way') or the taliter esse ('being in such a way') of
things. Of course, we can express this kind of consideration of e.g. a
thing x as: "x's being is in some way" etc.
3, The different kinds of consideration of things as explained
above can be expressed in language by different word order. Word order
is one of the means to make clear that things are conceived either
according to a specific concept, or without a concept being relevant.
In the illustration to my thesis about Peter ' s text, I gave
djQigc^pecuniam as example of an intensional context . Here , the noun
(pecuniam) follows the verb (diligo) with which it is construed.
Pecuniam dj^ ligo is the illustration of an extensional context. Here,
the noun precedes the verb with which it is construed.
As De Rijk ( 1980: 230) has pointed out, 'word order was often
considered very important, since word order was viewed as the
rendez-vous of grammar and ontology ' . Indeed , by way of word order ,
the distinction between knowledge and things could be expressed.
3. Peter of Hanuta on ' entia qualia/ ( ' qualitative beings ') and 'entia
J 'possible^  beings ' ]
Peter of Mantua starts his treatise De veritate et f alsitate ,
sive de taliter et quai i ter with two premissiones ('axioms') in which
he discusses two ways in which things can be said to be. In the first
axiom Peter considers things as they are individual and actual
exis tents, in the second axiom things are considered according to
possibilitas {'possibility'), that is here: non-actuality. Here Peter
uses his notion of modus essendi (way of being).
In discussing first the nature of things themselves according to
Peter's view I shall follow his text. From this discussion we shall be
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able to understand how things which are considered in the ways
mentioned above, are as beings. Secondly, I shall try to verify my
thesis of the text itself. I shall try to show that Peter carefully
distinguishes between the levels of ratio ('concept') and res
('thing1), and I shall indicate how he elaborates this distinction.
3.1 On 'entia' ('taeingsr) as 'entia qualia' ('qualitative beings')
ilPeter says:
1
 Premittamus primo quod orane ens est quäle : quia omne ens est
perfeeturn; ideo est quäle. Consequentia patet: quia, si omne ens
est perfectum, ipsum est perfectum quale ipsum est; quia omne ens
est tale quale ipsum est.
Et adhuc dato, per possibile, quod prima materia a qualibet
forma accidentali et substantial! esset denudata, ipsa esset
quäl is, quia figurata. Tenet consequentia a specie ad genus. Ex
quo sequitur quod non omne quod est quale, est quale per aliquam
qualitatem ab eo distinctam; est enim quelibet qualitas qualis
cum ipsa sit intensa vel remissa.'
('Axiom I. Every being is qualitative: for every being is
perfect; therefore every being is qualitative. The inference is
valid: if every being is perfect, every being is the perfect
thing it is itself, for every being is such as it is itself.
Even if the prime matter were deprived of every accidental
and substantial form - which is possible - , the prime matter
would be qualitative, for it would possess shape. This is a
inference from species to genus. Consequently, everything which
is qualitative is not qualitative because of a quality which can
be separated from it: every quality is qualitative because it is
intense or remitted').
In his first axiom Peter interprets actual entia as entia qualia,
i.e. qualitative beings.
First, Peter argues, all beings are perfect. I interpret this as:
things are what they are, e.g.: a cow, or something white, is perfect
just because it is a cow, or something white, however mortal it is or
subject to change.
Secondly, Peter says that even prime matter is qualitative: for
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if it is deprived of substantial or accidental form (e.g. 'cow-ness',
or whiteness), which seems possible to Peter, this prime matter stil l
is qualitative. The reason is that it possesses shape. All qualities
of things (substantial, or accidental, or the shape of prime matter)
are qualities because of their intension or remission, i.e.: because
of their possession of grades of form. Peter clearly links these two
properties of a form both to substantial or essential qualities, and
to sensible qualities, (which is the 'accidental form' of Peter's
treatise) and even to prime matter. The Dutch historian of science
Dijksterhuis (1969:186) concludes: "Pre-Thomistic Scholasticism did
not explicitly link this question (i.e. whether charitas ('charity')
in man (...) admits of change in the sense that it may be more or less
intense at different moments - E.P.B.) with the intensity-problem for
sensible qualities ; from Thomas Aquinas onwards, however, this was
done regularly."
That Peter links intension and remission to substantial (or:
essential ) form is even more remarkable. In this respect the way in
which he preserves the identity of a species seems to me to pose
problems. Peter apparently interprets all things in the world as
possessing greater and lesser degrees» and consequently, as being they
are different from each other. Peter seems to come close to a
Heraclitean notion of flux.
Elsewhere I have concluded that in his Logic Peter shows what I
call: a 'physicist' approach to things: things are interpreted by
Peter as being in constant change in time. Peter's attribution of
intention and remission to substantial form confirms my earlier
interpretations, I feel.
3.2 On 'entia' as ^entia possibilia' ('possible beings')
Peter's second axiom runs as follows:
'Adhuc premittamus quod omne ens est cuilibet enti simile aliquo
modo et cuilibet enti aliquo modo similiter se habens. Quia:
quodlibet ens est possibile, et quodlibet ens est possibiliter
ens qualiter quodcumque aliud ens quod detur; igitur omne ens est
cuilibet enti simile et cuilibet enti similiter se habens.
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Item, quocumque ente dato ipsum eet ens quod non eu i übet ent i
secundum omnem suum modum agendi vel essendi est infinite
dissimile; igitur quocumque ente dato ipsum est cuilibet ent i
simile et similiter se Habens. Patet consequentia illa: quia sicut
omne finite magnum est parvum et omne finite difficile est facile,
sic omne finite dissimile est simile'.
( ' Axiom II. a. Every being is in some way equal to any other
being, and in some way possesses an equal mode of being as any
other being. For every being is a possible being, and every being
possesses possible being in the way any other being possesses
this ; therefore, every being is equal to every other being and
possesses an equal mode of being as every other being.
b. Every being of whatever sort is a being that is not
infinitely unequal to any other being according to every mode in
which it acts and is ; therefore, any being whatever is equal to
any other being and possesses an equal mode of being as every
other being. This inference is evident: just as every finite big
thing is small, and every finite difficult thing is easy, so every
finite unequal thing is equal'}.
My interpretation of Peter's second axiom:
Entia are equal to each other on the level of their being
possibile {'possible') and therefore, Peter implies, are possible.
By possible Peter means, as will be evident from the subsequent
14)
discussion: not-impossible in the sense of: not being a necessary
actual being (said of God) or a contingent actual being (said of
creatures). Peter takes possible in a broad sense of the word. Under
this aspect things are equal to each other, because they are
considered as non-actual.
In Peter's view, things possess possible being (possibiliter se
habere) in virtue of their being possible things. The nature of the
being (esse) of things is dependent on the nature of the thing itself.
As Peter says somewhere else in his tract : celum est aliqualiter
( 'the being of the heaven is of some kind' } is based on: celum est
aliquale ('the heaven is of some kind1).
Things being possible are on the same level with things being
finite. Under the latter aspect all things are equal in their modes of
297
E.P. BOS
being and acting.
In an answer to an objection Peter says:
1Sicut recto nihil est rectius, et nihil est intense aut remisse
rectum, ita nihil est intense aut remisse possibile'.
('Just as nothing is more right than that which is right, and just
as nothing is intensely or remittedly right, so nothing is
intensely or remittedly possible1).
There are no degrees in the domain of possibility and, indeed, in the
domain of correctness, which is equivalent to possibility.
To wind up this section: I conclude from Peter's second axiom that
the equality of entia, according to possibility, is based on his
interpretation of actual entia as entia qualia. The two ways in which
things are considered here are dictinct : entia can be said to be
unequal {the first axiom) and equal (the second axiom).
It may also be concluded that, on the one hand, things can be
signified as things (aliqua) in the outside world, and, on the other
hand, the mode of being of things can be the signif icate of
propositions. In the subsequent discussion I shall return to Peter's
-1 Q \
dualistic conception of signification.
5. Peter of Mantua on 'aliqualiter esse^  (^ jaeing in some mode' ) and
'tauter esse' ('being in such a mode/)
This distinction between possible and actual is elaborated by
19)
Peter in this conclusion:
'Ex quibus sequitur quod quodlibet aliqualiter esse est cuilibet
aliqualiter esse simile. Patet hoc, quia: omne ens est cuilibet
enti simile et quodlibet aliquale est cuilibet aliquali simile;
igitur quodlibet tauter esse et quodlibet aliqualiter esse est
cuilibet tali esse et cuilibet aliquali esse simile.
Quo dato sequitur quod quodlibet ens aliqualiter est et taliter
ipsum non est, et taliter ipsum non potest esse. Celum enim est
aliqualiter et taliter ipsum non est. Patet quia: sicut celum est
aliquale et tale ipsum non est, celum est aliqualiter et taliter
ipsum non est.'
( ' I conclude: every being-in-some-way ia equal to every other
being-in-some-way, for: every being is equal to every other being,
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and every being-of-some-sort is equal to any other being-of-
some-sort; therefore, every being-in-that-way and every being-
in-some-way is equal to every being of-that-sort and every
being-of-some-sort.
On this premiss it follows : every being is a being-in-some-
way, but being-in-that-way it itself is not, nor can it itself be
so. For, the heaven is in-some-way, but being-in-that-way the
heaven itself is not; for: just as the heaven is of-some-sort,
but something-of-that-sort it itself is not, so the heaven is
in-some-way but in that way it itself is not'3.
I infer, first, that the similitude {'equality') of things under
the aspect of aliqualiter esse is on the same level as the equality of
things under the aspect of possibiliter esse.
Secondly: according to Peter, the aj.iqualiter esse is based on a
thing's aliquale esse; I have referred above to this reduction of the
nature of a mode of being to the nature of a being itself.
Thirdly: in the first paragraph of the text just quoted the
conclusion after igitur should of course have been identical with the
conclusion which follows it: Ex quibus sequitur quod quodlibet etc. In
fact they are not identical: a) the relation between aliqualiter esse
and aliquale esse is inserted; b) a new element is introduced, viz.
taliter esse and tale esse. This is unexpected.
In the passsages which follow, Peter makes clear how he uses the
two expressions aliqualiter esse and taliter esse. The inference from a
proposition in which aliqualiter is used after the verb with which it
is construed, to a proposition in which taliter is used in front of the
verb, is illicit, just as it is illicit to pass over from possibility
to actuality. The different levels in the significations of things are
indicated here by way of word order.
In Peter's treatise the different considerations of things concern
both specific characteristics of being as such, e.g. contingent, and
substantial and accidental properties like money or whiteness, that is:
properties of contingent beings. However, Peter exemplifies the
distinction primarily by way of terms denoting specific characteristics
of being as such.
God can be considered by the human mind, on the one hand,
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according to what He is in Himself, viz. the Necessary Being, or as a
Contingent Being; in the latter case, contingent should be qualified by
necessary. For it is necessary that God can act contingently towards
creatures.
On the other hand, God can be considered according to His
relations to creatures outside Himself. Then He can be considered as
being contingently to whatever (ad utrumlibet), in the way in which the
human will is often defined in medieval tracts, or contingent in a
certain moment (instans) or in the way a human being is contingent.
According to the latter consideration of God, He is described in His
relations towards creatures.
Subsequent to our last quotation, our author says :
1
 (1) Licet tarnen sit concedendum quod Deus est aliqualiter et
tauter ipsum non potest esse, et de omni alio ente sirailiter,
(2) negandum tarnen est quod aliqualiter Deus eat et non taliter
potest esse.
(3) Et si arguitur quod sic: quia contingenter Deus est in hoc
instant! et non contingenter potest esse, igitur Deus est
aliqualiter et non taliter potest esse,
(4 ) huic dicitur de virtute sermonis negando antecedens: Deus
enim est contingenter in hoc instanti et contingenter potest esse,
quamvis non contingenter ad utrumlibet Deus possit esse, quia
necessario Deus potest esse. Verumtarnen contingenter Deus non
potest esse, quia modo contingent! quo tu vel hoc instans est,
Deus non potest esse,1
(' (1) This should be conceded, however:
God's being is in some way but that way of being He himself cannot
be. This is the case for all other things.
(2) On the other hand, this should be denied: God's being is in
some way, but it is not the case that that way of being He himself
can be.
(3) Objection: God's being is contingent in this instant of time,
and it is not the case that it can be contingent. Therefore, God's
being is in some way, and it is not the case that His being can be
in that way.
(4) Answer to the objection: the antecedent is denied by virtue of
300
PETER OF MANTUA DE TALITER ET QUALITER
the terms used: God's being is contingent in this instant of
time, and it can be contingent, although He cannot be contingent
to anything whatever, for God is necessarily contingent. However,
God as God Himself can not be contingent, for in the way that
you, or this instant of time, are contingent, in that same way of
being God cannot be.')
In the last words of the text Peter says that God's Being cannot
be contingent, that is : not in the way creatures can be said to be
contingent. According to Peter, God can be said to be contingent in His
relations to creatures. According to this aspect He communicates with
creatures. This is not, however, God's Essence. So, one cannot without
any further qualification convert Deus est contingenter ('God's Being
is contingently (meaning: viz. towards creatures)), into: Contingenter
Deus est ('A contingent being God is in Himself).
The two ways of signification used by Peter in the preceding lines
are brought together in a text (in which, by the way, Peter denies the
validity of an inference):
'Sic etiam non sequitur: qualitercumque li homo significat
hominem, taliter ilium hominem significat; sed principaliter
significat hominem, igitur principaliter ilium hominem signifi-
cat.'
('This inference is not valid: In the way the term 'man' signifies
man, in that way it signifies this man; now, the term 'man'
primarily signifies man, so, it primarily signifies this man1).
My conclusion is that, in Peter's view, if the signification of a
term is primarily to something in some way, e.g. a content {i.e. the
intensional context}, the same term does not in the same way ana
primarily signify an individual man (i.e. the extensional context}. The
two levels of signification should be kept apart. In Peter's Logica we
find a sharp distinction between the various ways in which a thing, or
things, can be signified.
According to our logician, one should bear in mind, first, not to
confuse the level of naming according to a specific concept (or, to put
it more briefly: the level of the ratio ('concept')) with the level of
naming things when a specific concept is not relevant (short: the level
of the res ('thing')).
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Secondly, one should not apply a specific concept according to
which a thing is conceived, to another thing. On the level of ratio the
different concepts are formally different (though materially they can
be the same, for these different concepts can refer to the same thing).
Peter's position can be exemplified when in his treatise an
opponent argues that from Peter's axioms it follows: Aliqualiter
qualiter Deus est, ipse non est ('In some way as God is, He is not').
The inference is valid, according to the opponent, for:
' Isto modo Deus non est ( demonstrando modum quo celum est ), et
i Ile est aliqualiter qualiter Deus est; igitur aliqualiter
qualiter Deus est, ipse non est.'
( ' In this way God is not ( the way in which the heaven is, is
pointed at); this is some way as God is, therefore in some way as
God is, He is not1).
The opponent argues that this consequent proposition viz. Aliqualiter
qualiter JJeus est, .ipse non est is correctly inferred ; the consequent
is false, however. The opponent does not give reasons for his rejection
of the truth of the consequent. Perhaps he concludes to the falsity
because he does not distinguish between the different ways in which God
is named in the first part of the consequent as opposed to the second
part.
As is clear from his answer Peter carefully distinguishes between
the ways in which the two parts of the consequent signify, in
accordance with what he has said earlier in his tract. Peter admits the
consequent as true.
28)
He says:
'Ad secundus dicitur concedendo istam conclusionem sicut et istam:
Aliqualiter j)eus est qualiter nescit se esse. Similes etiam sunt
concedende: (1) Aliqualiter qualiter scis esse, nullus homo seit
esse. Quia, demonstrate modo ignoto homini, tune ille modus est
aliqualiter qualiter scis esse, et ille modus est aliqualiter
qualiter nullus homo soit esse, igitur etc. Et sic de multis aliis
dici potest.
(2) Similiter concedî débet quod: Aliqualiter qualiter seit esse,
taliter dubitas esse, et: Qualitercumque jiliquis homo seit esse,
taliter ipse dubitat esse, posito quod per aliquam propositionem
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sciât aliquis homo sic esse vel sic, et aliquam aliam dubitet.
Qualitercumque enirn seit aliquis homo, taliter ipse non potest
seire.'
('Reply to the second objection: I concede the opponent ' s
conclusion [viz. 'in some way as God is, He is not' - E.P.B.]. I
also concede similar propositions : ' In some way as you know
something to be, no man knows it to be. ' For, if something is
known to be in a way as another man does not know it to be, than
that way of being is in the way you know something to be, and
that way is some way as no man knows it to be; therefore etc.
This applies to many other cases.
Likewise, I concede: In some way in which you know something to
be, in that way you doubt it to be. Further: in whatever way that
a man knows, that something is, in that way he doubts it to be
(on the assumption that by way of some proposition a man knows it
to be so or so, and that by way of another proposition he doubts
it to be so or so. For, in whatever way a man knows something to
be, in that way he can not-know something to be1).
In this text Peter makes two things clear:
1} Ad C1) : A concept according to which a man (e.g. Socrates}
knows something, is the way in which Socrates knows something: it is
quite possible (as it is in Peter's example) that another man (e.g.
Plato) does not know the same thing with the same concept* Peter wants
to make clear, I think, that Socrates' concepts of a thing is his
individual concept corresponding to a property of a thing of which
Socrates conceives.
2) Ad (2): one and the same man (e.g. Socrates) can know something
by way of some particular proposition, but can have doubt about some
thing by way of another proposition. Here Peter says, I think, that in
these two ways of conceiving things according to different mental
attitudes (viz. knowledge and doubt) the thing itself is not thereby
affected. Peter intends to keep separate the levels of ratio as opposed
to res.
-
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6. Peter of Mantua on signification
Peter's definition of signification corresponds to his distinction
29)
between ratio and res. He gives three more p_resuppqsitipne_s
('axioms') on signification:
IV. Item, presupponatur quod nihil potest intelligere intellectus
humanus quod non poasit intelligere esse ens. Patet quia: ens est
primum obiectum intellectus; ideo tantum ens, seu aliquid, potest
intellectus humanus apprehendere aut intelligere.
V. Et adhuc accipiatur quod significare est virtuti cognitive
aliquid vel aliqua vel aliqualiter representare.
Ex quo sequitur quod nihil potest aliquod signum significare
quod non possit intellectus intelligere. Patet, quia bene
sequitur: hoc significatur, ergo hoc intelligitur.
Ultimo accipitur quod ex additione sincathegoreumatis ( sjl c)
aut termini nihil significantis termine aliquid significanti non
résultat complexum quod significet aliud quam signifiéet i Ile
terminus cathegoreumaticus cui additur id sincathegoreuma seu
terminus nihil significans. Verbi gratia: significatum
32)huiusmodi complexi omnis homo aut aliquis homo si aliquid sit
eius significatum, non est aliud quam significatum illius termini
homo. Patet hec suppositio intelligenti materiam.
('Axiom IV: The human intellect can only understand something
which can be understood to be a being. This is evident: being is
the first object of the intellect; therefore, the human intellect
can only apprehend or understand: being, or something.
Axiom V: To signify means: to respresent something, or some
things, or in some way, to the cognitive power.
Conclusion: a sign can not signify something which can not be
understood by the intellect. For this is signified, therefore this
is understood is a valid inference.
Axiom VI (last axiom): if a syncategorematic term (that is: a
term which does not signify anything by itself) is added to a term
which does signify something, the result is not a complex of terms
which signifies something other than is signified by the
categorematic term, to which the syncategorematic term (that is a
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term which does not signify anything by itself) is added. E.g.:
if the complex every men, or some men do have a significate, this
signif icate is the same as that to which the term men refers.
This axiom is clear').
From Peter's fourth axiom I conclude that the human intellect can
only apprehend or understand something which can be understood to be a
being, or something. Peter does not say: 'The human intellect can only
understand something which is ' . Peter carefully distinguishes between
the levels of ratio and res.
Now, that which can be understood can be signified. Signification,
according to Peter in his fifth axiom, is about: 1) a thing, or things;
or it is about: 2) some way in which things are.
The first object (1) of signification are things that exist in the
world, the second object (2) is not. From the conclusion Peter adds to
his fourth and fifth axiom, I infer that in Peter's view the levels of
both signification and understanding should be distinguished from the
level of existence: the levels of ratio and res should be kept
separate.
From the sixth axiom, the distinction between ratio and res
becomes even more clear: a change or addition of syncategorematic
terms, i.e. of terms which do not signify on their own but depend for
their signification on categorematic terms, does affect the mode of
signi f'icationT not the significate in the outside world.
Peter is justified, I feel, in drawing this conclusion from his
34)
axioms :
'Ex istis iam acceptis inferamus quod quacumque propositione data
affirmâtiva, sive vera, sive falsa, que aliqualiter esse
significat, precise sicut est, significat.'
('From these axioms I conclude: if an affirmative proposition
(true or false) signifies a mode of being, it signifies just as
something is').
In this case of signification, viz. aliqualiter esse, the term
precise C'just') qualifying ' is ' indicates that a specific form of
thinking, or speaking, about the world is at issue. In these contexts
Peter uses as synonym of precise: adequate.
Another consequence of Peter's view to distinguish between the
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levels of ratio and res^  is that the significate of one of a pair of
contradictory propositions is the same as the sign i flea te of the other
35)proposition. Peter argues as follows:
'Preterea sequitur quod omne significatum unius contradictoriorum
est significatum alterius, et quidquid significatur per unum,
significatur per aliud. Patet illud ex ultima et penultima
suppositione: quia, si aliquid esset significatum unius quod non
esset significatum alterius, née esset propter syncathegoreuma
quod est in una positum et non in alia: sed syncathegoreuma non
variât significatum, quia nichil significat, sed solum variât
modum significandi propositionis: igitur etc.'
('Therefore, every significate of one of a pair of contradictory
propositions is the signif icate of the other of this pair:
Whatever is signified by one, is signified by the other. This is
evident from the last and penultimate axiom [that is : the fifth
and sixth quoted above - E.P.B.]. For, if something would be
the signif icate of one of the pair of contradictory propositions
and not of the other
 t this would be the resu11 of the
syncategorematic term which occurs in the one and not in the
other. A syncategorematic term does not change the significate,
however: for this term does not signify anything, but only changes
the mode of signification of a proposition. Therefore, etc.')
The distinction between ratio and res is worked out by Peter in some
other respects as well, which I shall not discuss here.
7. Conclusion
My conclusion is, that Peter distinguishes sharply between:
la. the mode of being of things and:
Ib. the things themselves;
2a. the specific concepts by which things are conceived and:
2b. the concepts of things when no specific concept is relevant.
For the human mind's understanding of things the levels of ratio
and res are kept apart by Peter. For example : the addition of
syncategorematic terms like non (added to a verb), omnis and quidam
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function on the level of ratio and do not affect the level of res.
The difference between the two levels may be indicated by
different word order. Conversion of a proposition in an intensional
context into a proposition in an extensional context is not allowed.
One of Peter's main devices in expressing the different levels of
consideration of things is his use of taliter and qualiter, inter alia
in connection with word order. A title like De taliter et qualiter,
then, seems preferable as the title of Peter's treatise discussed
38)
E.P. BOS
NOTES
0. I thank Mr. J.Deahl (Leiden) for the correction of my english.
1. For the years within which Peter probably composed his Logica see
James, 1974: 163
2. Edition Padua, 1477, f.63vb, 11.38-39. I thought it desirable to
number the folios with Arab figures; this seems to be an easier
notation, and, moreover, one that is more often used in early prints
than the combination of letters and Roman numbers at the bottom of
the incunable folios. So, I have numbered the tract De taliter et
qualiter: ff.53va-63vb. 1 have numbered the lines of each column on
each folio 1-39. Each column of the 1477 edition contains the same
number of lines, I have compared the text of this early print with
the text preserved in MS. Vatican, Bibl. Apost. Vat., lat. 2135
(dated 1416).
For other early prints and munuscripts containing Peter's Logica
(or parts of it, see Bos 1982: 232 (notes 7 and 8».
3. I shall give my view on the title to be preferred for the treatise
in the conclusion of this paper (par.7).
4. F. 54ra, 11.37-39; f.54rb, 11.26-27.
5. F.54rb, 11.3-4.
6. Frege, 1975: 41.
7. The example pecuniam diligo as such is not to be found in Marsilius'
Appellationes.
8. For Buridan on this topic, see Van der Lecq, 1983: ch.6.
9. F.53va, 1.30- f.53vb, 1.8
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10. For a more detailed discussion of this problem, see Maier, 1968,
ch.I.
11. Bos, 1981: 250; and Bos, forthcoming.
12. F.53vb, 1.8 - f.53vb, 1.26.
13. Modus] MSS Venice, Bibl.Naz.Harc., Padri Red. 457 (My siglum: = VI)
f.Slva; Venice, Bibl.Naz.Marc. VI 128 (=V2) f.34vb; Oxford,
Bodleian Libr., Canon. Misc. 219 (=0) f.lOSrb; Vatican, Vat. Libr.,
lat. 2135 (=Va> f.eira; motus ed.1477.
14. See, esp., par.5 below.
15. F.54rb, 11.16-20
16. F.54vb, 11.17-27
17. F.54vb, 11.26-29
18. Par.6
19. F,54rb, 11.5-17
20. See p. 297 above
21. In the 'second' conclusion of the text: 1) tauter] entaliter VI
(f.34vb), 0 (f.lOBva); essentialiter Va (f.61rb); ens tauter V2
(f.34ra)) // 2) tali ] entali VI, O; essential! Va; enti tali V2
(All same folia as for the other variant reading of this note; for
the sigla, see above, note 13J. The MSS are not unanimous.
'Essentialiter1 may be a gloss.
22. Cf. above, p. 294
23. P. 298 above.
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24. r.54rb, 11.20-38.
25. Huic] ego, sed huic inc., MS. Va.f.61rb.
26. F.54vb, 11.2-6
27. F.55ra, 11.8-12.
28. F.SSrb, 1.31-f.55va, 1.9.
29. The third axiom (which is third at least according to ray interpre-
tation; the text is not clear on this point) is on f.55va,
11.19-24. This axiom is not discussed in this paper.
30. F.56va, 1.14-f.56vb, 1.1.
31. Significatum] MS Va (cf. note 18), f.62rb signo inc.
32. Complexi] MS Va (Cf. note 18), f.62rb complex™ inc.
33. Maieru's (1974: 168-9) conclusion is the same.
34. F.57va, 11.20-24.
35. F.59rb, 1.32- f.59va, 1.6.
36. P. 304.
37. E.g. the problem of propositie plures (associated with the problem
of equivocity); the relation between senses and intellect.
38. Cf. note 3.
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